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NUMBER I

Since mismanagement of the national forests can result in irreparable damage, and since Congress, in delegating the management
function, has granted such broad administrative discretion, the author
believes that an examination, and perhaps a reappraisal, of the extent
and right to judicial review of these vitally important management
decisions should be undertaken immediately.

THE NEED FOR MEANINGFUL CONTROL
IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FEDERALLY
OWNED TIMBERLANDS
James P. Rogers*

O

does not approach this subject without trepidation.
For about six decades the relationships between the
Forest Service, as the custodian and manager of the national
forests, and those who are dependent upon those forests in
various ways, have proceeded with relative calm. To suggest
that these relationships could now be disrupted and on
occasion need outside, third-party, review against arbitrary
and capricious action might well be called a species of lese
majeste.
NE

In today's world we can foresee, however, far greater
problems and pressures than heretofore, with respect to the
management of the national forests. That we have thus far
achieved considerable success in avoiding real controversy
among competing interests under statutes vague to the point
of license does not mean that we will hereafter do so. Nor
should it be considered alarmist to suggest the possibility
that under existing law there are chances for arbitrary and
Davies, Biggs, Strayer, Stoel and Boley, Portland, Oregon; A.B.,
1935, University of Arizona; LL.B., 1938, University of Washington; Member
of the Washington, Oregon, Multnomah County and American Bar Associations.

*Partner,
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capricious action which, when done, cannot be undone, and
could well be forever detrimental to the best interests of the
whole people in whose hands the ownership of these forests
lie.
It is interesting to note that of late there has been an
increasing number of articles dealing with the lack of control
the people have in the management of the federal lands which
they, as citizens of the United States, own. In 1962 Professor
Charles A. Reich took a penetrating look at the subject in
"Bureaucracy and the Forests."' In May of 1966 Professor
Norman Wengert' wrote an apparently unpublished paper
called "Changing Relationships Between Government and
the Forest Products Industry: An Exploration of Policy
Processes." In the Land and Water Law Review Raphael J.
Moses contributed an article entitled What Happened to
Multiple-PurposeResource Development .- A Plea for Reasonableness.' Some of the basic legal problems to be considered here were examined by Louis L. Jaffe' in an article
entitled "The Citizens as Litigant in Public Actions: The
Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff.'" And of course
Messrs. Clawson and Seld have examined in their book The
FederalLands: Their Use and Management the nature of the
decision-making process and the lack of outside review controls over it.
All these, and many others, deal in one way or another
with the problem of the citizens' control-or its lack-over
administrative actions of the executive departments of the
federal government. It is not the purpose of this paper to
cover too much territory in a field this broad; it is our
intent here to examine the bases of some of these problems,
and to delineate within the framework of our present system,
considering only federally owned forests, whether and to
what extent we have in the right of judicial review some
safeguards against the exercise of uncontrolled discretion in
executive decision-making.
1. Copyright The Fund for the Republic, Inc., Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara, California.
2. Professor of Political Science, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan.
3. 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 435 (1968).
4. Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard University.
5. Symposium by University of Pennsylvania Law Review and Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities of the American Bar Association,
August 1968, p. 1033.
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It should be noted that the title of this paper relates to
the need for meaningful controls on federally owned timberlands; this then excludes Indian lands but includes timberlands managed both by the Forest Service and by the Bureau
of Land Management, and to some extent by various other
executive agencies of the federal government such as the
National Park Service.
The problems are, inherently, the same whichever agency
manages these lands, but their major impact is felt in those
managed by the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture. In volumes of timber growing, and sold, from
nationally owned lands the percentage of public domain and
National Park lands is small indeed. The only timberland
area the BLM manages of significance is the "O&C lands"
in western Oregon,' for example. While the statutory scheme
for these lands is not basically dissimilar from those covering
the national forests, and the land ownership pattern, being of
the checkerboard type, resembles much of the lands in the
national forests, their 21/2 million acres is so relatively minor
that we can lump that subject in with the much larger one
here considered.
The national forests, and their management, have their
major impact in the western United States, that is, the entire
area west of the 100th meridian.7 Elsewhere their importance

wanes, from zero, through negligible, to almost important.
And it is in the areas where the national forests are most vital
to the economy that political power has always been lowest.
In the House of Representatives most of that power comes
from the states east of the Mississippi, where the importance
of the national forests to the economy is less than great. Thus
it has usually been the Senate where the impetus for legislation relating to the national forests has most forcefully
come.8 In too many instances these were quasi-emergency
6. Act of August 28, 1937, 50 Stat. 874.
7. The federal government owns 34% of the total land in the 50 states. The
percentages of land owned by the federal government in selected western
states is: Oregon 52.2%, Alaska 98.3%, Arizona 44.7%, California 44.1%,
Colorado 36.1%, Idaho 64.3%, Montana 29.6%, Nevada 87.1%, Utah 67.3%,
Washington 29.4%, Wyoming 48.2%. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT.
OV COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 198 (87th ed.
1966).
8. Cf. floor debate in the Senate on H.R. REP. No. 12203, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess.
(1899), a deficiency appropriation bill, as reported in CONG. REC. 28002801, 2861, as illustrative. It is striking to observe how mcuh of the early
legislation relating to the forest reserves and the national forests came about
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matters, which may account for the breadth of the statutes
and the lack of overall policy guidance to the forestadministering agency and the courts as well.
Before considering the means of judicial review as a
possible checkrein on arbitrary administrative decisions of
the Forest Service we should note how broad is the discretion
given by the Congress to the managers of the national forests.
In effect, the Congress has said to the Forest Service, "Go
forth and manage," without setting any but the most minimal
standards for the control of decisional aspects of forest management. As Professor Reich stated it in his paper on
"Bureaucracy and the Forests,"'
The standards Congress has used to delegate
authority over the forests are so general, so sweeping, and so vague as to represent a turnover of
virtually all responsibility. "Multiple use" does
establish that the forests cannot be used exclusively
for one purpose, but beyond this it is little more than
a phrase expressing the hope that all competing
interests can somehow be satisfied and leaving the
real decisions to others.
As he puts it at another place:
In a democracy, laws and policies, including
laws governing publicly owned resources, must
theoretically be made in public by the people's elected
representatives. But in today's overcomplicated
world an overwhelmed Congress has been forced to
delegate a large measure of legislative power to
specialized executive and administrative agencies the
officials of which are not elected or directly controlled by the people.
Again, Professor Reich notes,
Managing the forests is no mere caretaker's job.
There are fundamental choices to be made---choices
that pit one portion of the public against another,
and that can change irrevocably the character of the
domain as a whole.
as Senate riders to House appropriation bills. The basic forest reserve
statute referred to by the Forest Service as its Organic Administration
Act, Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 35, 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1964), was itself
such a rider-to a Civil Expense Appropriation Act after it had passed
the House. Of. 42 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. Opinion #7.
9. See, supra note 1.
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Today's growing population tears insatiably at
the forests. As people spread into every corner of
the land the forests shrink. Armies of mechanized
campers invade. Dam builders covet choice valleys.
Sheep nibble the high pastures. The power saw turns
beauty into board feet. Roads drive deep wounds
into the solitudes.
Management must decide between the competing
demands on the forests. When different uses clash,
which shall be favored? How are local needs to be
balanced against broader interests ? Should the requirements of the future outweigh the demands of
today ?
In sum grants, in other fields, of such discretion to an
executive department or agency by the legislative branch
would have been deemed grants of the legislative power itself,
and would thus have run afoul of the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers in which only the legislative legislates
and the executive administers that legislation. But ever since
United States v. Grimaud, and its companion, Light v.
United States, 1 it seems to have been accepted doctrine, in
the Forest Service and elsewhere, that in this peculiar and
complex field of such varying conditions and circumstances
the Congress has an impossible task in setting clear legislative guidelines. Read the words of Mr. Justice Lamar in
Grimaud:
In the nature of things it was impracticable for
Congress to provide general regulations for these
various and varying details of management. Each
reservation had its peculiar and special features;
and in authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to
meet these local conditions Congress was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and
not delegating to him legislative power.
Read again the same Justice in Light:
"All the public lands of the nation are held in
trust for the people of the whole country." United
States v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U.S. 160. And it
is not for the courts to say how the trust shall be
administered. That is for Congress to determine.
The courts cannot compel it to set aside the lands
10. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
11. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
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or to suffer them to be used for agrifor
settlement;
cultural
or grazing
purposes; nor interfere when, in
the exercise of its discretion, Congress establishes a
forest reserve for what it decides to be national and
public purposes. In the same way and in the exercise
of the same trust it may disestablish a reserve, and
devote the property to some other national and public
purpose. These are rights incident to proprietorship,
to say nothing of the power of the United States as
a sovereign over the property belonging to it. (Emphasis supplied.)
We will shortly refer to the italicized words in the above
quotation.
There is, of course, a considerable difference between the
legislation involved in Grimaud and Light and that of the
present day. Those were relatively simple: the former case
involved the Secretarial authority under the 1897 Act 12 to
make provision for the protection against destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests
and forest reservations; and he may make such rules
and regulations and establish such service as will
insure the objects of such reservation, namely, to
regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve
the forests thereon from destruction;and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and
regulations shall be punished as prescribed in Rev.
Stat., § 5388. (Emphasis supplied.)
Today's statutes which Professor Reich discusses are
not only of a different generation but a different generality.
For example, Section 2 of the Multiple Use Sustained Yield
Act of 1960' reads:
The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and
directed to develop and administer the renewable
surface resources of the national forests for multiple
use and sustained yield of the several products and
services obtained therefrom. In the administration
of the national forests due consideration shall be
given to the relative values of the various resources
in particular areas. The establishment and maintenance of areas of wilderness are consistent with
the purposes and provisions of sections 528-531 of
this title.
12.
13.

Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. 35, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1964).
Act of June 12, 1960, Pub. L. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531
(1964).
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Surely the breadth of this grant of language justifies Professor Reich's comment that it does little more than express a
hope "that all competing interests can somehow be satisfied."
The question, then, is whether there are any areas, in
the administration and operation of the national forests, in
which a final action of the Secretary of Agriculture (in most
cases the Forest Service) can be challenged, however harmful
that action may be or however mistaken its basis. If so, where
are they; if not, should there be, and where 7
A not inconsiderable part of the problem discussed here
is the fact that when the federal government deals with the
national forests it wears two pieces of headgear, as Mr. Justice
Lamar noted in the foregoing quote from Light v. United
States. The hat of a proprietor is one, the crown of the sovereign the other. This concept creates problems in which those
who must deal with the government as adjoining private
timberland owners often know the frustrations of secondclass citizens.
A significant example of the operation of this dual status
of the United States has arisen in connection with rights of
way for forest access roads in areas where federal and private
timberlands are intermingled in a checkerboard ownership
pattern, a common situation in the West.
In such ownership patterns it is quite obvious that neither
the government's timber nor the private owner's timber is
available for use except by access across the lands of the
other. The same situation exists in the O&C lands in western
Oregon. On April 5, 1950, the Secretary of the Interior issued
regulations 4 requiring reciprocal right-of-way use agreements as a condition of granting access to private timberlands
adjacent to the O&C lands managed by the BLM. These
regulations were the forerunners of the present Forest Service
regulations,1 5 though originating in the 1937 O&C Act.
For many years it was thought that, as to national forest
lands, the Secretary of Agriculture was required to grant
revocable access to privately owned lands across lands man14. As orginally
43 C.F.R. §§
15. The present
are found in

issued, 43 C.F.R. §q 115.154 to 115.179 (1950); now cited as
2234.2-3(b) to 2234.2-4.
reciprocal right-of-way regulations for national forest lands
36 C.F.R. §§ 212.10 to 212.12 (1968).
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aged by the Forest Service, but that the Secretary had no
power to compel the private applicant to grant reciprocal
rights to the United States. By an opinion dated February
1, 1962, however, the Department of Justice dispelled that
notion and two years later, in 1964, the Congress enacted
Public Law 88-657 allowing the Secretary to grant permanent
easements across Forest Service-managed lands in exchange
for permanent easements across adjacent private lands."6
While this once-explosive situation has quieted down,
candor compels the observation that when dealing with the
Forest Service for reciprocal right-of-way and road-use
agreements the private timberland owner is still almost
wholly dependent upon the good will of that Agency's personnel. Where two private landowners are in similar situations their bargaining power is usually about equal; in states
where constitutions and statutes allow landlocked timberlands
to be made accessible by private eminent domain proceedings,
such as Washington and Oregon, 7 neither can impose unreasonable burdens on the other. And even in states which have
no such basic protections for unlocking this timberlands door,
neither side is likely to promote a "Mexican standoff" for a
very long time.
When the private owner negotiates for access with the
Forest Service for the lands it manages, however, there is a
completely unknown limit to the demands which that agency
can make, as a sovereign, though it is basically acting in a
proprietary capacity. If the private landowner has no practical means of achieving some sort of equality at the bargaining table, if worse comes to worst, the bitterness and frustration which can result is bad for everyone, perhaps most for
the Forest Service itself.
Another example: Upon the supply of logs from lands
managed by the Forest Service virtually the entire forest
products industry of the western states depends. Few in those
states are the owners of sufficient volumes of timberlands to
supply much of the nation's wood fibre needs from their own
16. For a well-written history of this problem and its solution, Bee Robert
Kennedy's Big Case, 74 American Forests, No. 9 (J. Craig ed. Sept. 1968).
1i. See ORE. CONST. art. I, § 18 and ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 376.505 to 376.540
(1967). See also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
8.24.010 to 8.24.040 (1961).
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forests for any length of time; if sales of logs from national
forest lands were suddenly to be stopped, chaos would result.
It is estimated that in the states of Washington and Oregon,
for example, something around 50 percent of their entire
economy is dependent directly or indirectly upon the forest
products industry. And necessarily the nation's housing and
other wood fibre needs can be supplied only if the production
of logs from the vast timberlands managed by the Forest
Service in the West continues unimpaired.
Yet few realize that there is no obligation whatever upon
the Secretary to sell one log from national forest lands, except
as it may be an incident to the management of those lands for
sustained-yield production. He is authorized to sell, but not
required to do so, and the amount he sells is completely within
his administrative discretion.
Here is a matter of life and death to the economy of the
West and to the nation as a whole. But is arbitrary and capricious action foreclosed only by what are really political considerations, that is, the politico-economic effects which would
result if, on a large scale, the production of logs from the
national forests were stopped, or impaired by conditions so
unreasonable as to amount to a direct prohibition? Is there
any right of review of arbitrary action in a part of national
forest management so important as this ?
Consider a matter of very recent history as illustrative:
Another portion of the 1897 Act 18 provides that
[T]he Secretary of Agriculture may cause to be
designated and appraised so much of the dead,
matured, or large growth of trees found upon such
national forests and may sell the same for not less
than the appraised value to be used in the State or
Territory in which such timber reservation may be
situated, respectively, but not for export therefrom.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On April 12, 1926, the Congress amended this flat prohibition
to say that:
Timber lawfully cut on any national forest, or
on the public lands in Alaska, may be exported from
the State or Territory where grown if, in the judg18. See supra note 12.
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ment of the Secretary of the department administering the national forests, or the public lands in
Alaska, the supply of timber for local use will not be
endangered thereby, and the respective Secretaries
concerned are authorized to issue rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this section.'"
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Congressional command, then, from 1926 to today,
with respect to the sale and use of timber from the national
forests was that the logs were to be reserved for the use and
benefit of the people of the state in which each forest lies,
unless the Secretary determined that local use would not be
endangered by the export of such logs beyond that state's
boundaries.
How has even so explicit a Congressional command as
this been applied?
During the past several years the export of softwood
logs to Japan from the national forests of the Pacific Northwest, initially the states of Oregon and Washington and later
Idaho, California, and western Montana, became a very
serious problem, becoming one of the important factors which
have driven stumpage prices sky-high, to the detriment of
local mill operation, local employ-ment, and national lumber
and plywood prices. If the clear Congressional commands
with respect to log export were obeyed, it could not help but
have some substantial effect on the ills excessively high log
prices create for the national as well as regional economics.
Yet in the face of the statutory commands above noted,
and in the face of the fact that the Secretary had not made,
and with today's great wood fibre demands could hardly make,
a finding that logs produced from these national forests were
unnecessary for local use, the Secretary took no action to
enforce, or to ask the Department of Justice to enforce, the
prohibition against export of those logs."0
19. Act of April 12, 1926, 44 Stat. 242, 16 U.S.C. § 616 (1964).
20. The fact that the "Morse Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1968 was finally adopted by the Congress and became law with the President's signature on October 9, 1968, does not take away the problem, since
that legislative action would have been unnecessary had it been clear that
judicial means were available to users of national forest timber to compel
the Secretary of Agriculture or the Attorney General, or both, to carry
out the Congressional commands.
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These examples are, of course, within the primary area
of commercial forest use, but those interested in other usesrecreation, for example-are equally vulnerable to the Secretary's action or refusal to act. The Secretary has it in his
power to set aside, or refuse to set aside, large forest acreages
for recreational and scenic purposes, and the Chief of the
Forest Service may do the same for wild areas. The Chief
of the Forest Service may by administrative decision irrevocably affect the watersheds on which we are utterly dependent for the volume and purity of our water, the habitat for
our game, the forage for our stock, and the other forest values
on which we set such great store. And when these decisions
are made, they are often of such nature that they cannot be
unmade.
Are administrative decisions of such vast importance
as these left without a chance of judicial review against arbitrary or capricious action or inaction, or flagrant mistake
however honest ?
Not so long ago the answer would have been a flat "yes,"
likely, in virtually every instance; today it is probably the
opposite in a substantial number of cases.
One of the difficulties is, as we have noted, that most
of the statutes themselves are of such generality as to afford
little, if any, standards by which a court could say that administrative decisions have not followed the Congressional
mandates.
2 1 is apt, though
Frost v. Garrison,
a Park Service rather
than a Forest Service case. The plaintiffs were guides and
Nor does it matter whether the Secretarial inaction was brought about
by not-to-be-resisted 1968 pressures from the Departments of State and
Treasury, and Executive Department agencies, seeking to make the products
of the national forests instruments of international trade rather than of the
welfare of the people who owned them.
The experience here suggests that even in instances where the statutes
respecting national forest management have been quite explicit, they are
subject to other executive and administrative insistence in the name of a
wholly different "public interest," which cannot help but disquiet those
vitally interested in national forest management. This time the prospective
"loser" was the commercial bidder for national forest timber, and whose
employees, their families, and their suppliers also lost, under a very explicit
statutory scheme. Under a more general one could recreationalists be equal
victims of the public "welfare"? Could the timber set aside for recreational
uses be equally thereafter committed to help our nation in what the State
Department considers a higher "public use"-in logs exported in international trade?
21. 201 F. Supp. 389 (D. Wyo. 1962).
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outfitters in and near Yellowstone Park who sought to enjoin
National Park Service employees from embarking on a program to kill off about 5,000 elk, their presence being considered detrimental to the Park. Plaintiffs sought to prevent
this slaughter on the ground that it was cruel, needless, and
unnecessary, and that the elk were not detrimental to the
Park. The court had little difficulty in disposing of the case
by dismissal under the following language contained in one
of the basic statutes2 2 governing national parks, which in part
reads as follows:
He [the Secretary of the Interior] may also provide
in his discretion for the destruction of such animals
and of such plant life as may be detrimental to the
use of any of said parks, monuments, or reservations.
Since the Congress had thus given the Secretary of the
Interior, and through delegation from him the Park Superintendent, untrammeled discretion to order the slaughter of any
Park animals, the court was not empowered to overrule him
however (apparently) arbitrary or capricious or mistaken
his action might be. Thus the court never reached a trial on
the merits of whether or not the presence of the elk was
"detrimental" to the Park.2 3
Second and more difficult, however, in the field of
judicial challenge of administrative decision under statutes
of such generality, is the question of "standing to sue," that
is, the right of a person or group to ask for and obtain
judicial review of such decisions as these. Even were the
statutes involved more specific-for example, the term "the
public interest" were more clearly delineated-who is entitled
to raise the point in court? Are the courts likely to apply to
today's conditions and requirements of national forest management tests of a far older period when fewer conflicts in
what is "the public interest" were possible
22. Act of August 25, 1916, 39 Stat. 535, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
23. See also Lansden v. Hart, 180 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1950), involving an attempt
by landowners and hunting club owners and operators to enjoin enforcement
of provisions of Presidential and gubernatorial proclamations closing an
area of about 20,000 acres in Illinois to the hunting of wild geese, the
statutes and regulations involved implementing migratory bird treaties
between the United States and Great Britain and the United States and
Mexico. In that case the court also examined the "merits," holding that the
treaties were the law of the land, the statutes implementing them were not
unconstitutional, and the regulations, broad as they were, were authorized
by those statutes.
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Perhaps one of the most striking statements of a court
on defining the criteria by which one obtains "standing," by
which we mean, of course, not the ability to get into court but
to stay there, was made in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
TVA, 4 where the court said, by Mr. Justice Roberts, that
a person threatened with injury by government action or
inaction may not challenge it
unless the right invaded is a legal right,-one of
property, one arising out of contract, one protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute
which confers a privilege ....
...
[T]he damage consequent on competition, otherwise lawful, is in such circumstances damnum absque
injuria, at 137-40. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the preceding year the Supreme Court had decided a
similar case, Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes.2 5 In the year following Tennessee Electric the court decided Perkinsv. Lukens
Steel Co.," in which the same test was laid down.
In Tennessee Electric and Alabama Power the plaintiffs,
private power companies, challenged the creation and operation of TVA as a governmental entity producing electric
power sold to industrial users, municipalities, and cooperatives operating distribution systems which sold competitively
with the complainants. In applying the "legal injury test"
the court held that injury to the private power companies
was injury lawfully inflicted; that no law gave them absolute
power to be free of lawful competition; and therefore such
injury as they suffered, even to the point of financial ruin,
was damnum absque injuria.
More strikingly to this subject, Perkins involved wouldbe bidders for government contracts who were "blacklisted"
under the Public Contracts Act2 7 and contended their blacklisting was caused by an administrative error of statutory
interpretation so that in order to obtain such contracts and
remove their "blacklisting" status the plaintiffs would be
required to comply with wage schedules founded upon an
error of law. Without considering whether or not the alle24.
25.
26.
27.

306 U.S. 118 (1939).
302 U.S. 464 (1938).
310 U.S. 113 (1940).
Act of June 30, 1936, 49 Stat. 2036, as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1965).
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gations of the complaint were true, that is, that the Department of Labor had in fact erred in construing the Act, the
court in effect held that the right to bid competitively for
government business is not a legal right, saying:
We are of opinion that no legal rights of respondents were shown to have been invaded or threatened
in the complaint upon which the injunction was
based. Respondents, to have standing in court, must
show an injury or threat to a particular right of
their own, as distinguished from the public's interest
in the administration of the law.2"
Perhaps some language froman opinion by Judge Frank
in Associated Industries of New York v. Ickes, 9 illustrates
best the plight of those who depend upon national forestproduced logs for their livelihood, or would-be recreational
users of the national forests for their enjoyment. In that
case Judge Frank said:
That the plaintiff shows financial loss on his part
resulting from unlawful official conduct is not alone
sufficient, for such a loss, absent any such invasion
of the plaintiff's private substantive legally protected interest, is danmnum absque injuria. Thus, for
instance, financial loss resulting from increased lawful competition with a plaintiff, made possible solely
by the defendant official's unlawful action, is insufficient to create a justiciable controversey. More is
required "than a common concern for obedience to
law.""0 (Emphasis supplied.)
These rules, if today applied, would tell us that judicial
review of administrative decisions relating to the very fundamentals of national forest management are unlikely. For
under them who has a "vested legal interest" in obtaining a
contract right to enter and cut national forest timber ? What
individual or group has a "vested legal interest" in the setting
aside of an area of national forest timberlands for scenic and
recreational purposes? To go even further, does any intermingled private landowner have a "vested legal right" to
reach his forest lands which lie within the boundaries of a
28. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 111, 125 (1940); see also Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
29. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1948).
30. Id. at 700-01.
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national forest, in view of the "Minnesota
Cases" ?"1

Wilderness

There is some language in the opinion of the Attorney
General of February 1, 1962,2 suggesting that, in the field
of access to intermingled lands, arbitrary or capricious action
in a denial of that right within the national forest boundaries
might subject such Secretarial action to judicial scrutiny;
near the end of that opinion the Attorney General said,
As the Supreme Court pointed out in United States
v. Grimaud,220 U.S. 506, 516-517, it is your function
to determine what private use of the national forests
in any given case is consistent with the purposes
sought to be attained by the statute. The imposition
of harsh and onerous requirements not related to the
benefit received or to your general responsibility to
preserve and manage the national forests, might well
constitute an abuse of discretion.
It may be that the denial of access across national forest
lands to one's own property by arbitrary or capricious action
would constitute an invasion of a "vested legal right" giving
the victims sufficient "standing" to test that action. But
here are industries, their employees, and whole communities
utterly dependent upon the sale of logs from the national
forest; if they are deprived of those logs through action, or
failure to act, by the Secretary, what rights have they to
enter and remain in court?
Since 1960, at least, the Congress has made it clear that
recreational uses of the national forests is one of the objectives
of their management and has indicated clearly the intent to
set aside for such use national forest areas primarily valuable
for that purpose. Have those who would benefit from those
uses standing to review an action which set aside the wrong
area, or refused to set aside any, even though a realistic
determination of all the facts would have justified other
action than the Secretary took or failed to take?
We come here into some of the most vexing problems of
constitutional law and the administration of our legal system.
Perko v. United States, 204 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
832 (1953); Bydlon v. United States, 175 F. Supp 891 (Ct. C1. 1959); and
Mackie v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 306 (D.C. Minn. 1961).
32. 42 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. Opinion #7.
31.
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First, the judicial power of the United States is limited
by Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution to the determination of "cases" or "controversies"; it does not extend
to abstract legal questions.
Second, the courts are rightly reluctant to throw open
the judicial portals to spurious or obviously mistaken cases
and thus occupy the judicial time to no avail."
Third, the courts desire in litigants raising a "case"
"controversy"

or

such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. 4
These present the basic reasons why the courts have frequently gone to the "legal interest" rule to deny "standing,"
thus avoiding the merits of the controversy, whether of constitutional or statutory origin.
In the field here discussed, that is, conservation of natural
resources, the legal breakthrough came in Scenic Hudson
PreservationConference v. FPC,35 where an unincorporated
conservation group prevailed on the court to set aside an
order of the Federal Power Commission licensing the Storm
King Project of Consolidated Edison on the Hudson River,
because the Commission had failed to compile a record sufficient to support its decision. The objections were that the
Commission had not considered scenic values, recreational
values, and the effect on wildlife, particularly fish, of the
project in balancing its merits and demerits. The court
ordered the matter sent back to the Commission for further
hearings and consideration in which these factors ought to
be considered. This case marks perhaps a beginning point
for judicial intervention in the interest of conservation concerns in the guidance of administrators of our natural resources, not necessarily because natural resources were involved but because a new concept of "standing" is in the
judicial air.
33. See Koll v. Wayzata State Bank, 397 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1968), as a virtually
perfect example of such a case.
34. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
35. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
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Several other reasonably recent cases foreshadowed this
ruling.86 These all have one thing in common, that is, that
in the statutes being construed the Congress had provided for
an appeal from an administrative ruling or decision to any
party "aggrieved." Since none of the statutes governing the
management of national forest lands has in it such a provision, is that lack per se fatal to judicial review? It does
not appear so.
Of themselves the words "parties aggrieved" create no
judicial magic; if there were no jurisdiction in the court to
consider the merits of the attacked decision, the Congress
could not by their use have created it. 7 Review at the instance
of a "person aggrieved" in the Communications Act of 1934,
the Federal Power Act, and the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938, involved in these cases, would at most
have indicated a Congressional desire that administrative
decision should not always escape judicial scrutiny, a concept
the courts would not necessarily heed.
Flast v. Cohen,3" decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 10, 1968, provides the touchstone for this
observation. The court there allowed a taxpayer, if she could
prove the essential elements of her interest in the administration of certain portions of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, to question the constitutional propriety of the expenditure of federal funds for projects allegedly forbidden by that document.
While the point sought to be raised by the taxpayer was
a constitutional one, the principles are not different from
the point raised in the cases previously referred to" beginning
with Sanders in none of which would the plaintiff have that
legally protected interest required by the line of cases beginning with Tennessee Electric Power.
In the United Church of Christ case, for example, the
petitioners-plaintiffs were listeners or would-be listeners of
36. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Scripps-Howard
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d
Cir. 1953); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
37. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
38. Flast v. Cohen, 88 S.Ct. 1942 (1968).
39. See supra note 36.
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a radio station who contested the renewal of its FCC license;
in other of these cases the petitioners were competitors of
applicants for FCC licenses. These were, in the language of
Judge Frank in Associated Industries of New York v. Ickes,"0
"private Attorney Generals."
This designation of a new status for objectors to administrative or regulatory decisions seems wholly apt to our
inquiry here. In a special concurring opinion in Flast Mr.
Justice Douglas used this precise language to say that in a
constitutional case:
Taxpayers can be vigilant private attorney generals. Their stake in the outcome of litigation may be
de minimus by financial standards, yet very great
when measured by a particular constitutional
mandate.
This same principle is equally applicable to challenges of
Congressional authority.
This new judicial course in making available the courts
to objectors of arbitrary, capricious, or unauthorized action
by executive or administrative decisions is basically directed
to the protection of the individual or group against the action
of a government grown so big as frequently to be insensible
to the rights and requirements of its citizens. The objectives
of these ever-increasing decisions broadly construing "standing," in constitutional cases or otherwise, have been plainly
put by Professor Jaffe in his paper, "The Citizen as Litigant
in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff,"41 in which he said in part,
There are important reasons for allowing citizen suits. Some of these have less applications to
questions of constitutionality than to questions of
the legality (the vires) of administrative and official
action. It has now become a commonplace that the
individual citizen in our vast, multitudinous complexes feels excluded from government. Thus, while
governmental power expands, individual participation in the exercise of power contracts. This is unfortunte because the feeling of helplessness and
exclusion is itself an evil, and because the individuals
and organized groups are a source of information,
40. See supra note 29.
41. See supra note 5.
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experience, and wisdom.*** [T]here can be no question that there is danger that officials and their
staffs will become attached to certain positions and
to certain accommodations which narrow their vision.
For these reasons procedural devices, which enable
citizen groups to participatein the decision-making
process and to invoke judicial controls, are very
valuable ....

f .. Citizen participation is not simply a vehicle
for minority protection, but a creative element in
government and lawmaking. The usual taxpayer and
citizen suit is thoroughly consistent with the primacy
of majority rule. The issue will be the statutory
authority of the official action, and the lawsuit itself
will be prescribed by statute. The conservation and
broadcasting cases emerge, then, as excellent examples of the lawsuit as a form of citizen participation
within a framework established by majority rule.
(Emphasis supplied.)
These comments, related both to constitutional or statutory controversies, forecast the same philosophy expressed
by Mr. Justice Douglas in his special concurring opinion in
Flast, where he said:
The Constitution even with the judicial gloss it has
acquired plainly is not adequate to protect the individual against the growing bureaucracy in the Legislative and Executive Branches. He faces a formidable opponent in government, even when he is
endowed with funds and with courage. The individual is almost certain to be plowed under, unless
be has a well-organized active political group to
speak for him. The church is one. The press is
another. The union is a third. But if a powerful
sponsor is lacking, individual liberty withers-in
spite of glowing opinions and resounding constitutional phrases.
I would not be niggardly therefore in giving
private attorneys general standing to sue. I would
certainly not wait for Congress to give its blessing
to our deciding cases clearly within our Article III
jurisdiction. To wait for a sign from Congress is to
allow important Constitutional questions to go undecided and personal liberty unprotected.
There need be no inundation of the federal
courts if taxpayers' suits are allowed. There is a
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wise judicial discretion that usually can distinguish
between the frivolous question and the substantial
question, between cases ripe for decision and cases
that need prior administrative processing, and the
like.' When the judiciary is no longer "a great rock"
in the storm, as Lord Sankey once put it, when the
courts are niggardly in the use of their power and
reach great issues only timidly and reluctantly, the
force of the Constitution in the life of the Nation is
greatly weakened.
"'The general indifference of private individuals to public ornissions and encroachments, the fear of expense in unsuccessful and even
successful litigation, and the discretion of the court, have been, and
doubtless will continue to be, a sufficient guard to these public officials
against too numerous and unreasonable attacks." F6rry v. Williama,
41 N.T.L. 332, 339 (S.Ct. 1879).

There is little doubt but that these observations would apply,
as Mr. Jaffe has indicated, as well to Congressional as to

constitutional authorization for a given executive or administrative decision, and the review the courts would afford it.
The principle goes back not to Scenic Hudson alone, but
to The Chicago Junction Case4" decided in 1924, where the
Supreme Court, at the behest of several railroads deeming
themselves adversely affected by an ICC decision allowing
the New York Central Railroad to acquire control of a crucial
and until the independent belt line railroad in Chicago
required the Commission to hear the plaintiffs' objections
and take evidence on the harms to "the public interest" if the
acquisition were permitted. Despite the lack of Congressional language in the Interstate Commerce Act giving a right
of appeal by "a person aggrieved," the court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Brandeis, held that it was the Commission's duty under the Act to protect the plaintiffs from
unlawful competition. Since the Commission had not so
construed the statute and therefore denied the plaintiffs a
hearing on their objections, the court returned the case to
the Commission in order that these be heard and considered.
Although Chicago Junction was not cited in Scenic Hudson, it is on all fours with it in principle, and discloses that
the "person aggrieved may appeal" language is not vital to
judicial review when a statute protects a class of citizens,
42. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258 (1924).
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whatever the composition of that class-in Chicago Junction
railroads, in Scenic Hudson conservation groups.
We can now try to translate these legal principles to the
management of the national forests and the review of decisional aspects of that management in circumstances where
groups of people deem themselves adversely affected by those
decisions.
First, despite the substantial increase between the 18971905 period and today in the statutory objectives of forest
management, and therefore the number of that management's
beneficiaries, it does not appear likely that the courts will
deny their portals to a class of persons who have had their
"rights" invaded by executive or administrative decision in
the natural resource field.
Second, Chicago Junction and Lansden both tell us that
the "person aggrieved" language in the statute is not vital
to judicial review of such decisions; even in Frost the District
Court did not rely on the "standing" issue to avoid decision,
though it considered only the generality of the statute rather
than the merits of the executive action.
Third, in these cases, where the plaintiff represents a
class of citizens who are given an interest in the decision, i.e.,
outdoor recreationalists, potential bidders for timber, applicants for range permits, or fish and wildlife interests," for
example, the courts will not in most cases tell the Secretary
or the Chief of the Forest Service what to decide. They will
instead review the factors and considerations upon which he
acted. If he used the wrong ones or false ones, refused to
use those he should have used, or discriminated between
members or the interested class, they will remand the case to
him for a new decision in which he has used all of the proper
criteria the Congress has specified in the statute and the
Constitution requires. Thus, it seems, would the judiciary
protect statutorily created general interests and enforce "due
process" concepts, and yet avoid invasion of the executive
department's functions.
43. Listed in the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act § 1, Act of June 12, 1960,
74 Stat. 215, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1964).
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* It is difficult not to feel sympathy for the Forest Service
in its developing problems. For many years-from 1905 until
about 1939-its functions was primarily custodial, with overtones of benefits to timber-using industry and the communities those industries supported. Suddenly, with the onrush of
World War II and the nation's burgeoning needs for all kinds
of wood fibre products, it became a merchandiser while still
retaining its custodial functions.
Then, before it could become acclimated to this new role,
came the population explosion, the shortening workweek and
lengthening vacation, the jet airplane and the camper truck;
out of the blue the forests became the focus for vast numbers
of recreational users and their pressure organizations, in addition to the other uses to which they were previously put.
These uses, and others, are the result of all of the "rights"
the statutes confer. It would be an anomoly indeed if, simply
because these are forests rather than something else, the
courts would be considered powerless to protect in some manner both the Forest Service from bad decisions and those who
should be beneficiaries of those decisions. Even if the right
of judicial review of these decisions was never used, it should
still be there in proper cases. The citizen frustrated without
recourse by his government is a bad citizen.
It is not the author's intent in this paper to examine in
other than general terms the subject of judicial review as it
may be specifically applied to the field of federal timberland
management. One would be bold indeed who flatly predicted
the types of cases in which final action on the part of the
Chief of the Forest Service or the Secretary of Agriculture
could be judicially reviewed; we are only aware that there
is a line somewhere between those which should, and should
not, be subjected to judicial scrutiny. There are hundreds of
such decisions annually; the judicial sifting through a multitude of cases to determine the review line entitles us to
shudder.
We can be aware, however, that the doctrines of Grimaud
and Light, elucidated in a day when only the custodial features of the national forests were the subject of legislation,
are ill-suited to the statutory structure and obligations of
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national forest management in 1969. These additional groups
of forest users, for example recreationalists, have "rights"
courts are not likely to ignore, even though the law is still
in embryo in judicial review of decisions in the resource
field. By the same token, "older" users dependent upon the
national forests, in point of time, such as commercial producers of wood fibre products, should also have their interests
clarified and protected, lest without judicial recourse the
newer beneficiaries overwhelm them and those employees,
communities, and markets dependent upon them.
This situation cries out for the attention and action of
the Congress, which can take place in one or two sessions,
rather than in what could be the decades required for judicial
solution of these matters. It appears eminently desirable, not
only because of time but perhaps the results to be achieved,
that the Congress declare by well-considered and carefully
structured language the dividing line between those decisions
of national forest managers which ought to be reviewable and
which not, and at the same time provide more certain language
in the governing statutes themselves by which those who
manage these forests may in this pressure-laden field be
guided in their decisions.
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